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Abstract 
Bruno Latour claims to have shown that a Kantian model of knowledge, which he describes as 
seeking to unite a disembodied transcendental subject with an inaccessible thing-in-itself, is 
dramatically falsified by empirical studies of science in action. Instead, Latour puts central 
emphasis on scientific practice, and replaces this Kantian model with a model of “circulating 
reference.” Unfortunately, Latour’s alternative schematic leaves out the scientific subject. I repair 
this oversight through a simple mechanical procedure. By putting a slight spin on Latour’s 
diagrammatic representation of his theory, I discover a new space for a post-Kantian scientific 
subject, a subject brilliantly described by Ludwik Fleck. The neglected subjectivities and ceaseless 
practices of science are thus re-united. 
 
Key words: circulating reference; post-Kantian subjectivity; scientific practice; Bruno Latour; 
Ludwik Fleck. 
 
 
1. Introduction: It’s Not Easy Being Two-Dimensional 
 
Boa Vista sounds like a wonderful place. I learned of it from Bruno Latour, who describes it 
beautifully in the second chapter of his 1999 book, Pandora’s Hope: “Circulating Reference: 
Sampling the Soil in the Amazon Forest.” Yes, Boa Vista sits at the Amazon Forest. When I’d finished 
reading Latour’s engaging tale of scientific adventure, I wandered into my kitchen, where a large map 
of the world hangs on the wall. There it was, in the northwest corner of Brazil, a small dot under the 
tip of my index finger – Boa Vista. How I wished to be there! 
But maybe, somehow, I already was there. In his adventure story, Latour (1999, p. 65) writes 
that “the extension of the index finger always signals an access to reality even when it targets a mere 
piece of paper [...]. [T]hanks to inscriptions, we are able to oversee and control a situation in which we 
are submerged, we become superior to that which is greater than us.” Alas, after reading Latour’s lush 
account, my own experience of this small point under my finger tip felt pretty disappointing. Did this 
dot really give me access to the reality of Boa Vista? Did I, by spreading my hands across this world 
map, now oversee and control the situation in which I was submerged, my being-in-the-world? Sadly, 
no. I yearned to feel the gentle breeze of the savannah on my skin. I craved the warm camaraderie of 
Latour’s charming scientific field unit. Instead, I stood alone with my finger stuck to a tiny speck on a 
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faded map, enveloped in the miserably gray, wet weather of Switzerland in February. I did not feel 
superior. 
I sought solace back in the pages of Latour’s jungle tale. He admonished me to buck up: “Yes, 
scientists master the world, but only if the world comes to them in the form of two-dimensional, 
superposable, combinable inscriptions. It has always been the same story, ever since Thales stood at 
the foot of the Pyramids” (Latour 1999, p. 29). I tried to imagine myself as a vigorous player in this 
heroic history of two-dimensional mastery, lording over the world with my books and maps. But the 
bud had fallen from the vine. The three-dimensional rain battering the window of my study suddenly 
felt more powerful than Latour’s entertaining pep talk. 
 
2. Science in Three Dimensions 
 
In this brief essay, I’d like to introduce a third dimension into Latour’s two-dimensional account 
of scientific practice. My goal, like Latour’s, is a philosophical one. His chapter is an exercise in field 
philosophy. Rather than cogitating endlessly in his comfortable Parisian armchair, Latour rose and 
flung himself into the rugged and remote jungles of northern Brazil, journeying as a participant 
observer with a small, international group of plant and soil scientists. He was not there as a social 
scientist, but as a philosopher. An ethnography of scientific culture was not Latour’s brief, but the 
disinterested and merciless testing of an allegedly orthodox philosophical theory of “reference.” The 
test was a success, and the result was negative. The theory was dramatically falsified by the 
overwhelming evidence of science in action. However, as luck would have it, Latour’s philosophical 
field notes provided him with the material he needed to construct an empirically adequate alternative, 
his theory of “circulating reference.” 
Latour attributes the offending theory, just blown to bits in the Amazonian jungle, to the 
followers of Immanuel Kant. He provides a neat diagram depicting what he calls the “Kantian 
scenography” of this theory (Latour 1999, p. 72). Figure 1 closely approximates Latour’s diagram. On 
the left, we find inaccessible things-in-themselves, on the right, a disembodied transcendental subject, 
which Latour also calls the categorising “forms of the human mind” (Latour 1999, p. 71). The two 
sides are meant to meet – somehow – in the middle, where the phenomena reside. According to Latour, 
his Amazonian field test demonstrates that the countless attempts over the generations to unravel the 
mystery of this “somehow” amount to nothing more than a fool’s quest: “Our philosophical tradition 
has been mistaken in wanting to make phenomena the meeting point between things-in-themselves 
and categories of human understanding” (Latour 1999, p. 71). This may be so, depending on who 
“we” are. My own tradition, for one, didn’t hit the skids with Kant, but includes a distinctly post-
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Kantian contingent.1 But such niceties will not delay Latour (1999, p. 72): in order for him to repair 
the debilitating mistake in “our” tradition, “a fifteen-day expedition is all that is required.” 
Latour’s meticulous and penetrating expedition notes reveal that phenomena “are not found at 
the meeting point between things and the forms of the human mind; phenomena are what circulate all 
along the irreversible chain of transformations” characteristic of science in action (Latour 1999, p. 71). 
Hence, phenomena do not refer to inaccessible things-in-themselves, but only to each other. They 
circulate through a complex, multi-stage sequence of material practices, which Latour gathers under 
the labels “reduction” and “amplification.” He provides another neat diagram depicting the 
scenography of his theory of circulating reference (Latour 1999, p. 72). Figure 2 closely approximates 
this second diagram. 
  
The principal question prompted by Latour’s Kantian scenography is how a disembodied 
transcendental subject is supposed to gain epistemic access to definitively inaccessible things-in-
themselves. If you think that this question makes no sense, then you have understood the root of 
Latour’s  problem. Where is the sense in trying to gain access to things which have already been 
defined as inaccessible? And, anyway, without a body, how is a subject supposed to do anything at 
all? Something seems to have gone wrong here. At the very least, Latour’s Kantian scenography, as a 
depiction of scientific research, fails because it doesn’t provide a place for scientific practice. Rather 
than recognising phenomena as constituted within complex fields of practice, where things and 
embodied subjects naturally interact, it tries instead to imagine them as the meeting point of two 
impossibly divided spheres, those two little, self-contained orbs depicted in Figure 1. 
Latour will have nothing of this ridiculous scene. Having dramatically revealed its patent 
absurdity, he sweeps it off the table and erects his own alternative scenography in its place, the 
scenography of circulating reference. Figure 2 doesn’t just include a place for scientific practice, it is 
comprised entirely of practices from end to end. Across this expansive plane, phenomena ceaselessly 
circulate in a complex choreography of science in action. There is no longer a question of how 
                                                          
1 Among them Heidegger, from whom Latour has worked hard to distinguish himself; see Harman 
(2009), Kochan (2010), and Riis (2008). 
Phenomena 
Things-in-themselves Transcendental Ego 
Figure 1   Latour’s “Kantian scenography.” Phenomena reside where 
inaccessible things and the disembodied subject meet. But where are the 
practices? (Based on Latour 1999, p. 72.) 
Amplification 
Reduction 
Phenomena 
Figure 2   The Latourian scenography, depicting circulating 
reference. Phenomena circulate through a cascade of practices. But 
where is the subject? (Based on Latour 1999, p. 72.) 
4 
disembodied subjects hook up with inaccessible things, because the starting point for any question is 
now the recognition that things are always already swept up in an incessant current of referential 
scientific activity. Latour has replaced the apparently barren moonscape of Kantian epistemology with 
the lush and verdant jungle of his own theory of scientific practice. 
But wait. Something is still askew. In his enthusiastic rush to clear the deck of science studies 
for the new superstructure of circulating reference, Latour has also jettisoned the scientific subject. 
The little, self-contained orb on the right side of Figure 1 has also been swept out to sea. But how can 
there be science without a subject? If phenomena are reduced and amplified in fields of practice, then 
who is doing the reducing and the amplifying, where are the practitioners? The Latourian scenography 
leaves these questions unanswered, and perhaps not unintentionally. Latour has, after all, told us that 
he “can’t swallow much phenomenology [...] [and] never understood why consciousness was an 
important question anyway” (Crease et al. 2003, p. 21). As a result, he simply excludes the scientific 
subject from Figure 2. But this disappearance is less one of deletion than it is of submersion. What 
Roy Boyne calls an “indeterminate subjectivity,” an ineluctable and inchoate being-in-the-world, is 
threatened with suffocation as Latour sinks it beneath the smooth surface of his alternative 
scenography (Boyne 2001, p. 34). The result is an impoverished picture of the scientific research 
process. With one dramatic turn, Latour has successfully removed some of the deepest difficulties 
plaguing his Kantian problematic, but clearly there is still more to be done. If we are to preserve a 
place for the post-Kantian subject in our practice-based studies of science, then we need to introduce 
one more turn after the Latourian turn. 
  
This turn is really just a bit of spin. You can see it happening in Figure 3. It’s quite simple. Just 
spin the Latourian scenography 90° into the page. Latour’s two-dimensional account of science 
suddenly becomes three-dimensional! The lush scenography of scientific practice is still there. But 
instead of being spread out in two-dimensions across the surface of the page, it’s now been spun up 
onto its edge. Nothing has gone missing. Everything is still there. But all of the complex, multi-stage 
sequences of material practice, so assiduously catalogued by Latour, are now viewed from the edge, as 
stacked up on top of each other so that they form a deep and rich tissue of practices, a tissue 
 
Amplification 
Reduction 
Phenomena 
Tissue of practices 
Spin 90° into the 
page. 
Figure 3   The Latourian scenography is spun 90° into the page. We now view it from the edge. Nothing has been lost. Rather than being spread 
out on a two-dimensional plane, referential acts are now stacked in a rich three-dimensional tissue of practices. Phenomena ceaselessly circulate 
through this tissue. But the subject is still missing! 
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conveniently depicted in Figure 3 by a thick vertical line. Science has become three-dimensional once 
more! 
 
3. The Subject Is a Mess, Long Live the Subject 
 
Alas, viewed from the edge, the Latourian scenography now becomes a bit more difficult to 
decipher. But, if this should ever bother you, you could always just spin it back, so that everything is 
once more nicely laid out in two dimensions. In the meantime, putting Latour on edge has allowed us 
to free up some space. Space for what? For the subjectivities of scientific research, of course! 
Now things become a bit delicate. Our mission is not to append the scientific subject to the 
tissue of practices, but to reattach the tissue of practices to the scientific subject. In order to do this, we 
need to perform a sensitive surgical operation. We need to take the deep and rich tissue of practices 
from Figure 3 and transplant it into Latour’s Kantian scenography in Figure 1. Figure 4 depicts the 
procedure. The transformation is profound. Rather than the troubled collection of poor and underfed 
phenomena depicted in Figure 1, we now have a deep and rich tissue of practices in which robust and 
lively phenomena ceaselessly circulate – just what La(doc)tour ordered! 
                                                            
Alas, the operation has now left our patient looking a bit piqued. The perfectly self-contained 
orbs in Figure 1 have now turned into confused and tangled messes.  But that’s just life, and the 
patient will have to adjust. Being a post-Kantian subject can be tough work: just think of onion-
allergic Susan Leigh Star, struggling for recognition and a bit of nourishment in the apparently 
universal but lamentably onion-normative world of McDonald’s (Star 1991, pp. 34ff.). 
On the left side of the tissue of practices in Figure 4, inaccessible things-in-themselves have 
transformed into independent but accessible stuff. On the right side, the disembodied transcendental 
subject has transformed into an unstructured but embodied field of first-person subjective experience, 
what phenomenologists sometimes call “being-in-the-world.” Where in Figure 1 each side was 
depicted as a clear and distinct substance, in Figure 4 they have become chaotic and indefinite 
scribbles. The problem with Latour’s Kantian scenography was that it presupposed the order and 
determinateness of subjectivity and stuff, rather than recognising that order and determinateness arise 
Tissue of practices 
Independent stuff Being-in-the-world 
Figure 4   The living tissue of practices is carefully transplanted into Latour’s Kantian scenography, radically transforming the patient. Being-in-the-
world, the post-Kantian subject, combines with independent stuff in the tissue of practices, producing phenomena which now ceaselessly circulate 
through a three-dimensional landscape. Practice has been re-united with subjectivity. 
Tissue of practices 
A delicate transplant 
is performed. 
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only when subjectivity and stuff unite in a rich tissue of practices. Before that, subjectivity subsists 
only as a delicate tangle of undisciplined personal experience, a being-in-the-world keen to find a 
home with others, perhaps even to become a “modest witness” within the community of science – 
either in the gentlemanly sense of Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, or in the queer sense of Donna 
Haraway – or perhaps, instead, to splash out as an immodest scientific hero – as Latour depicts 
Pasteur.2 The post-Kantian subject is variously articulated within diverse fields of scientific activity, 
but it is not created ex nihilo by those activities. It subsists as a weak and indeterminate being-in-the-
world, achieving strength and stability only within the deep tissue of practices, where it may find the 
means to develop a disciplined public identity in concert with an ever more disciplined conflux of 
scientific colleagues and stuff.3 Ludwik Fleck has described this as a process of “crystallisation.” 
 
4. A Fleck of Good Sense 
 
Latour is a wonderful storyteller. His stories abound with charming and idiosyncratic characters, 
the author himself foremost among them. What a pity, then, that he left them out of his diagrammatic 
representation of science as circulating reference. Indeed, he didn’t just leave them out, he left himself 
out, too. There is no room in Latour’s diagram for the self, for ourselves, for us as fields of worldly 
existence, for our basic subjective experience of our own personal existence as being-in-the-world.4 
How does the scientist experience herself as blindly grappling with a chaotic and tangled mess of 
independent stuff, as painstakingly coaxing that stuff out of its independent state and into a deep and 
rich tissue of practices where she can then slowly bring it to order, and so make clear and unequivocal 
sense of it? 
Ludwik Fleck tells us how in his 1935 book, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. He 
argues that phenomena capable of supporting reliable statements of fact first begin to take shape when 
“there is a signal of resistance in the chaotic initial thinking” of the researcher (Fleck 1979, p. 95). 
This signal comes only on the heels of considerable effort, sometimes extended over long periods of 
time: “in the complex confusion and chaos which he faces, [the scientist] must distinguish that which 
                                                          
2 Shapin & Schaffer (1985, p. 65); Haraway (1997, p. 23); Latour (1983). 
3 Hence I resist Lorraine Daston’s and Peter Galison’s claim that “[p]ost-Kantian subjectivity” 
presupposes a “unified self organized around the will,” as well as their claim that “practices do not 
merely express a self; they [...] constitute it” (Daston & Galison 2010, pp. 33, 199). In my view, post-
Kantian subjectivity presupposes an unorganised and indefinite self, a self not so much constituted and 
expressed by practices as it is organised and specified by them. 
4 Yet Mark Elam suggests that Latour, the author, implicitly styles himself as “an untouchable subject 
[...] detached from, and not seriously embroiled in the different worlds he charts,” a “privileged 
observer” blithely projecting a self-assured impartiality and innocence (Elam 1999, p. 3). 
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obeys his will from that which arises spontaneously and opposes it” (Fleck 1979, p. 95). This “signal 
of resistance” announces that independent stuff and the experience of the researcher have finally 
encountered one another within the deep tissue of scientific practices. From there, the stuff is tirelessly 
coaxed, kneaded and shaped into a stable empirical phenomenon through a process which Latour 
places under the labels “reduction” and “amplification” and which Fleck calls “crystallisation.” 
According to Fleck (1979, p. 53) the history of a research field “involves the progress of vague and 
indefinable concepts which are about to crystallize.”5 
Yet, whereas the Latourian scenography provides an only two-dimensional account of this 
process, Fleck allows us to view it in three dimensions, as a phenomenological landscape inhabited by 
a scientific subject who slowly emerges from the chaos and confusion of its initial perceptions by 
pursuing fact-based knowledge of phenomena. Furthermore, in this landscape, we see not only how 
phenomena circulate through a cascade of transformations within an established tissue of practices, but 
also how a research community meticulously clarifies and brings under control independent and 
unmanageable stuff by resolutely drawing it ever deeper into a growing tissue of material associations. 
Through these efforts to crystallise phenomena, “primitive pre-ideas often lead continuously to 
modern scientific concepts” (Fleck 1979, p. 100). 
Fleck brilliantly supports his epistemological considerations with a detailed history of syphilis 
research. He observes that, at the end of the fifteenth century, the diagnosis of syphilis disappeared 
into what he calls “an undifferentiated and confused mass of information” and a “primitive jumble” 
(Fleck 1979, p. 1). It would take four centuries before the modern scientific concept of syphilis 
crystallised from out of this confused and jumbled diagnostic experience. Fleck (1979, p. 23) describes 
the process like this: “We have described a hazy idea of syphilitic changes in the blood and shown that 
this idea existed centuries before scientific proof was available. Emerging from a chaotic mixture of 
ideas, it developed over many epochs, becoming more and more substantial and precise.” This 
summarises a stunning phenomenological history of emergent scientific events within an evolving 
tissue of practices. A vague and undifferentiated disease entity encounters a correspondingly confused 
and uncertain scientific subjectivity. Over centuries, they become increasingly entangled in a deep 
tissue of developing diagnostic procedures, slowly becoming more and more distinct, more and more 
nuanced and clear, more and more definite and precise, as some avenues of explanation are 
strengthened and refined while others are blocked off and forgotten. Fleck gives us an outstanding 
three-dimensional description of the scientific research process. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 For a more detailed discussion of this process, see Kochan (forthcoming). 
8 
5. Conclusion: The Social Coordination of Scientific Subjectivity 
 
Two amicable and highly skilled soil scientists stand side-by-side in the jungle near Boa Vista 
(Latour 1999, pp. 62f.). They are “earth tasting.” They each carefully spit on a clump of soil cradled in 
the palm of their hands. They then knead the dampened clump with the fingers of the other hand. 
They’re trying to determine the texture of the soil. If it’s more clay-like, then it originally comes from 
the forest. If it’s more sand-like, then it originally comes from the savannah. 
“Sandy-clay or clayey-sand?” 
“No, I would say clayey, sandy, no sandy-clay.” 
“Wait, mold it a bit more, give it some time.” 
“Okay, yes, let’s say between sandy-clay and clayey-sand.” 
A third scientist makes a conscientious note of this subtle and coordinated judgement in her field 
journal. Latour (1999, p. 63) writes that “[l]acking any kind of gauge, Armand and René rely on a 
back-and-forth discussion of their judgments of taste, as my father would do when he tasted his Corton 
wines.”  
The message is clear and exciting: scientific perception is like wine-tasting! The scientist and 
the vintner are like two peas in a pod of extraordinarily refined subjective experience. They possess 
what Michael Polanyi called “personal knowledge”: “[t]o become an expert wine-taster, to acquire a 
knowledge of innumerable different blends of tea or to be trained as a medical diagnostician, you must 
go through a long course of experience under the guidance of a master” (Polanyi 1958, p. 54). This 
interpersonal education of the senses leads to the formation of what Steven Shapin calls “taste 
communities”:  these communities “coalesce around practices [...] that refer to mutually accessible 
external properties as the causes of internal states” (Shapin 2012, p. 178).6 
When Armand and René practice earth tasting, they are coordinating their internal subjective 
experiences using the mutually accessible external properties of spittle and soil. Whether this process 
of coordination involves two experts negotiating an agreement, or a student calibrating her experiences 
to those of her teacher, it is an eminently intersubjective process, a process which necessarily unfolds 
deep within the rich tissue of practices depicted in Figure 4. Both Latour’s Kantian scenography, as 
well as his own alternative scenography, failed to capture this important dimension of scientific 
research. Luckily, these shortcomings were easily repaired. All it took was a slight spin of the latter, 
followed by its delicate transplantation into the former. Latour required a fifteen-day expedition in 
northern Amazonia to resolve a problem in his Kantian scenography. From the cozy confines of my 
provincial armchair, I resolved a problem in the Latourian scenography in less than fifteen seconds. I 
rediscovered the scientific subject swept overboard by Latour’s two-dimensional model of science as 
circulating reference. Quite frankly, I’d have rather gone on the expedition. But when funds are 
                                                          
6 For more on Polanyi, Shapin, and taste communities see Kochan (2013). 
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limited one must sometimes make do with the inexpensive resources of one’s own subjective 
imagination, publicly circulating the results in the anxious hope that others may receive them as the 
sensible basis for a nice bit of social co-ordination.  
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